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Executive Summary
A Primer on Governance of the Family 
Enterprise is written both for families and for 
practitioners associated with or interested 
in family enterprises. By combining a 
rigorous review of existing studies with a 
practical perspective, the report seeks to 
identify best practices in family enterprise 
governance. Specifically, the two major 
questions are:
 − How is the family enterprise governed?
 − How does governance impact 
performance of the family enterprise?
The family enterprise includes family 
members; one or more family-owned, 
-managed and/or -controlled businesses 
(which may be private or public); often a 
philanthropic entity such as a foundation; 
and a family office. The governance system 
of the family enterprise is an integrated, 
interdependent and coherent architecture 
composed of the specific governance 
structure of each of its entities. 
Family governance refers to the 
rules, processes and institutions that 
enable family decision-making and the 
management of family affairs. The family is 
often characterized by multiple generations 
and multiple family branches, which 
over time present great challenges to 
maintaining family cohesion and norms. A 
customized governance system, tailored to 
the context of the specific family, can help 
ensure the sustainability and prosperity of 
the family business, enable family harmony 
and happiness, manage succession of 
ownership and control, and mitigate family 
conflict. The family governance system 
rests on the family’s shared beliefs and 
values. Formal elements often include family 
constitution, family council, family assembly 
and family committees. It is important to 
design an adaptable governance structure 
where decision-making is perceived to be 
fair.
This report discusses six major 
components of family firm governance: 
ownership structure, control mechanisms, 
board of directors, executive compensation, 
dividend policy and succession. The 
objective of corporate governance is to 
enable investors (owners) to obtain an 
appropriate return on their investment in 
the firm. Widely-held public corporations 
face the so-called “agency problem” – 
managers and investors may have different 
and conflicting incentives. While family 
firms can typically align management and 
ownership incentives, they are more likely 
to face another agency problem – the 
potential conflict of interest between family 
and non-family shareholders. Attention to 
this issue is an important consideration in 
all aspects of governance of the family firm 
(and enterprise). 
Substantial families with investable assets 
in excess of US$ 100 million often choose 
to set up their own family office – a 
professional organization dedicated to 
serving the financial and personal needs of 
the family. Recent studies have identified 
several best practices of family offices, 
including effective internal controls to 
reduce sources of risk for the family, in-
house handling of key activities, extensive 
and frequent communication with family 
members, education programmes for 
younger generations and succession 
planning.
The family foundation – typically a private 
philanthropic foundation supported by 
the family, the family business and its 
investment income – can be beneficial to 
the family for reasons beyond tax reduction 
and reputation. Three positive effects 
on family dynamics include provision 
of opportunities for financial education 
and cross-generational mentoring to 
family members, enhancement of family 
interaction and communication, and 
enlargement of the sphere of discussion 
in the family. This report describes the 
different family foundation structures, 
the potential advantages of hiring a non-
family administrator and the need for 
family foundations to choose between 
diversification and concentration in their 
grant-making strategy. 
Finally, the report explores in detail 
the relation between family enterprise 
governance and economic performance. 
The key findings are:
− The use of family governance practices 
enhances the financial success of the 
firm. 
 − The relation between family ownership 
and performance is similar to an 
inverse-U-curve: at first, it increases 
as family ownership increases, but 
decreases after a point. However, this 
positive relation is conditional on the 
family firm being transparent. 
 − The use of a “wedge” between voting 
rights and cash-flow rights (whereby 
the family hold voting or control rights 
beyond their ownership rights) adversely 
affects performance. This reinforces the 
advice that family firms should carefully 
consider which mechanisms to use to 
control their firms as their effects on 
performance differ.
 − Family firms generally prefer to have the 
heir manage the family business rather 
than an outsider. 
This report concludes with a discussion 
of the main findings and an extensive 
bibliography. The clear message that 
emerges from this review is the important 
role that a well-defined governance 
structure plays in the prosperity and 
longevity of the family enterprise. A codified 
family enterprise governance system 
contributes to enhancing family harmony 
and happiness, as well as family wealth. 
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1. Introduction
This report offers an up-to-date critical 
assessment of the received academic and 
professional literature on governance of 
the family enterprise. The family enterprise 
includes family members; one or more 
family-owned, -managed and -controlled 
businesses (which may be private or 
public); often a philanthropic entity such 
as a foundation; and a family office. 
The report’s aim is to identify the best 
practices in family enterprise governance. 
Specifically, it attempts to answer two 
major questions:
 − How is the family enterprise governed? 
 − How does governance impact 
performance of the family enterprise?
1.1 Background on Corporate 
Governance  
 
The concept of governance is prevalent in a 
broad range of settings. In the context of a 
widely-held public company, the separation 
between shareholders and management 
lies at the core of the governance 
problem.1 Such separation leads to a so-
called “agency problem”.2 Managers are 
shareholders’ agents and have control of 
day-to-day decision-making in the firm. 
However, separation between those who 
finance a firm and those who manage it 
may create conflicts of incentive between 
the two parties. When managers’ interests 
and shareholders’ interests are not aligned, 
managers may choose actions that benefit 
them and adversely affect shareholders’ 
returns on their invested capital. In this 
context, corporate governance is the 
mechanism created to minimize the risk 
of such a situation arising. In other words, 
the objective of corporate governance is to 
enable investors to obtain an appropriate 
return on their investment in the firm.3
In corporations that have one or more 
very large shareholders and many small 
shareholders, a conflict of incentive 
between these two types of shareholders 
may also arise as the large shareholders 
may navigate the firm in a way that benefits 
them and adversely affects the smaller 
shareholders.4 In this context, “corporate 
governance structures serve to ensure 
that minority shareholders receive reliable 
information about the value of the firm 
and that a company’s managers and large 
shareholders do not cheat them out of the 
value of their investment.”5 
Hence, the governance of a firm needs 
to be designed so as to alleviate these 
incentive issues and induce investors to 
provide financing to firms while minimizing 
the risk of misappropriation of their capital. 
With this in mind, governance can be 
defined as “the set of mechanisms that 
influence the decisions made by managers 
when there is a separation of ownership 
and control.”6 An alternative definition could 
be “the set of contracts that help align the 
actions of managers with the interests of 
shareholders.”7
Scholars have addressed a range of major 
corporate governance issues, including 
concentration of control in the hands of 
one shareholder,8 hostile takeovers,9 proxy 
voting contests,10 control by the board of 
directors,11 and executive compensation 
schemes aligning managerial interests with 
shareholder interests.12
The provision of transparent information to 
shareholders is critical to the effectiveness 
of the governance structure. Scholars 
have suggested that “limited corporate 
transparency increases demand on 
corporate governance systems to alleviate 
moral hazard problems resulting from a 
more severe information gap between 
managers and shareholders.”13 In fact, 
a large body of research has found 
that financial reporting mitigates these 
information asymmetries,14 thereby 
significantly alleviating the agency conflict.
Management scholars have built on the 
agency theory perspective on corporate 
governance to include such theories as 
resource dependence theory, stewardship 
theory and power theory.15 Resource 
dependence theory suggests that the 
board of directors, in addition to being a 
monitoring body, is an important catalyst 
of resources such as access to finance, 
legal advice and social capital. Stewardship 
theory broadens the perspective on 
the motivations driving managerial 
behaviour to highlight both the self-interest 
motivation of managers and their role as 
stewards of corporate resources, which 
is consistent with shareholders’ interests. 
The power perspective offers insights on 
the interaction between management 
and governance bodies. This thesis 
suggests that managers, while being legally 
subordinate to directors, may acquire 
extra power in certain situations, thereby 
having the opportunity to circumvent the 
monitoring function of the board. 
Governance mechanisms can be both 
internal and external.16 Among the internal 
mechanisms, the main examples are board 
of directors, executive compensation 
contracts and concentration of control. The 
main external mechanism for corporate 
control is the market. Furthermore, 
management scholars have also addressed 
the governance roles of organizational 
culture and norms, which serve as a 
powerful social control mechanism driving 
behaviour and contributing to organizational 
cohesion and alignment of incentives.17
By exercising substantial control on 
business and through their participation in 
management, family firms often manage 
to align the incentives between ownership 
and management. This has the effect of 
alleviating the classic owner-manager 
conflict that characterizes widely-held, 
publicly-traded corporations and on which 
much of the so-called “agency” literature 
has centred. However, family firms are 
more likely to be faced with another 
agency problem: the potential conflict of 
interest between family and non-family 
shareholders. Specifically, the controlling 
family may force managerial decisions 
that are in the best interest of family 
shareholders but may not be in the interest 
of all shareholders, thereby gaining private 
benefits at the expense of non-family 
shareholders. This is a widely prevalent 
phenomenon, and any discussion of 
governance in the context of the family firm 
must address this issue.
The objective of corporate 
governance is to enable 
investors to obtain an 
appropriate return on their 
investment in the firm.
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1.2 The Family Enterprise 
The various parts of the family enterprise 
include the family members, one or more 
family-owned, -managed and -controlled 
businesses (which may be private or 
public), often a philanthropic entity such as 
a family foundation, and a family office. 
Figure 1 depicts the key components of the 
family enterprise. The following definitions 
have been used for these entities: 
 − Family: A group of individuals related by 
blood, marriage or adoption, who have 
a claim on the family business or other 
common family assets. Family members 
may belong to multiple generations and 
may be part of multiple family branches. 
It is important to highlight that the family 
is not an investment group, meaning 
that people do not choose to be a part 
of it. This is the fundamental source of 
many of the distinctive features of the 
family enterprise that shall be discussed 
below.
 − Family Firm: A firm characterized by a 
substantial presence of the founding 
family. Whenever the founding family 
exercises significant influence through 
its equity ownership, voting control and/
or management, this report considers 
such a firm as a family firm. According 
to this definition, a family firm can be 
private or public; it may be led by the 
founder, by a later-generation family 
member or by professionals that are 
not members of the family. However, it 
should be noted that the literature has 
used a variety of different definitions. 
These can be divided into two groups: 
structural definitions (based on 
structural characteristics of the firm) and 
process definitions (based on the role of 
the family in the business).19
 − Family Office: The professional 
organization, owned and controlled by 
the family, created to serve the wealth-
management and personal needs of 
family members.
 − Family Foundation: The organization 
through which the family carries out its 
philanthropic activities.
The interconnections between family 
members and the family business can 
be depicted by the three-circle model 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 1: Family Enterprise Key Components
The family firm is the primary source 
of the family’s wealth. The literature 
has highlighted a set of characteristics 
differentiating the family firm from its non-
family counterpart:
 − Family firms have a preference for 
control, while non-family firms have a 
preference for cash-flows. 
 − Family firms have a long investment 
horizon, while non-family firms have a 
short investment horizon. 
 − Family firms are characterized by 
conflict of interest between family 
blockholders and minority shareholders, 
while non-family firms are characterized 
by conflict of interest between 
management and shareholders. 
 − Family firms face trade-offs between 
control, liquidity and growth, while non-
family, widely-held firms do not face a 
significant degree of such trade-offs. 
 − Family firms typically focus on 
investment projects with long payback 
periods, while non-family firms often 
focus on cutting costs to maximize 
short-term profits. 
Figure 2: The Three-Circle Model
Source: Tagiuri and Davis, 1996
Family Owners
Family  
Owner-Employees Business
Family
Family
Firm
Family
Office
Family Enterprise
Family
Foundation
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In fact, the prevalence of family firms has 
been documented in a number of studies. 
A study of the ultimate ownership of the 
20 largest public companies from the 27 
richest economies in the world found that 
30% of the sample were family-controlled, 
while 36% were widely-held and 18% 
state-owned.21 Of course, this result 
underestimated the importance of family 
firms as the authors considered only the 
largest firms and only in rich countries. 
Among the countries with higher family 
ownership among their 20 largest firms 
were Mexico (100%), Hong Kong (70%) 
and Argentina (65%).
A 2006 study of the 508 US-listed firms 
that have ranked among the Fortune 500 
between 1994 and 2000 found that 37% 
in the overall sample were family firms, 
a percentage that increased in specific 
industries such as personal services 
(67%), motion pictures (77%) and health 
services (56%).22 An analysis of ownership 
in 13 Western European countries found 
that 44% of firms were family-controlled; 
this percentage was above 50% in most 
countries in Continental Europe.23 
This trend holds in East Asia too: a 
study of ownership in nine East Asian 
countries found that the top 15 families 
controlled very large fractions of the market 
capitalization in most countries, including 
Indonesia (62%), the Philippines (55%) 
and Thailand (53%). The top 15 families 
controlled even larger fractions of the GDP 
in certain countries, such as Hong Kong 
(84%), Malaysia (76%) and Singapore 
(48%).24 
1.5 Methodology 
The objective of this report is to capture 
the key findings that the literature on family 
enterprise governance has offered, and 
translate them into best practices. 
The methodology consists of critically 
reviewing the received academic and 
professional literature on problems related 
to the governance of the family enterprise. 
More specifically, the procedure has 
involved:
 − Reviewing and selecting a subset of the 
received literature based on a rigorous 
quality criterion 
 − Using an interdisciplinary approach 
which draws from the fields of 
Management, Finance, Accounting, 
Psychology, Sociology and Economics
 − Combining the academic and 
professional literature, in order to have 
rigorous treatment along with practical 
perspective 
 − Considering the contributions of studies 
that use qualitative, analytical and 
empirical approaches 
1.3 Governance of the Family 
Enterprise
Family enterprise governance refers to the 
collection of mechanisms that enable family 
decision-making and implementation of 
policies concerning the management of 
family affairs, its businesses and related 
entities, such as its foundation and family 
office, in a manner that meets the mission 
and goals of the family. These mechanisms 
include formal structures, processes, rules 
and agreements, as well as informally 
shared family values, culture, beliefs and 
norms.
The governance system of the family 
enterprise is an integrated, interdependent 
and coherent architecture composed of the 
specific governance structure of each of the 
entities of the family enterprise, including:  
 − Governance of the family
 − Governance of the family firm
 − Governance of other family entities 
such as the family office and family 
foundation
Each of these specific governance systems 
is focused on in subsequent sections.
1.4 Why Family Enterprises 
Matter
The study of family enterprises is important 
mainly because family enterprises are 
prevalent in most economies worldwide. 
Despite this prevalence, the mainstream 
literature in business and economics has 
traditionally considered the widely-held 
corporation as the predominant paradigm 
of a firm. Therefore, most research has 
focused on questions relevant to that 
context. Only over the past two decades 
has attention been given to family firms. 
Academics have traditionally held the belief 
that in developed economies, at some 
point all firms would pass into the final 
stage of their evolution process – the public 
corporation with dispersed ownership. 
However, this phenomenon is far from 
universal. In few economies is the public 
corporation the dominant paradigm, and 
even in those economies family firms 
represent a large fraction of the market. In 
many economies of the world, family firms 
are clearly the most common type of firm. 
The dominance of the widely-held 
corporation has been questioned by many 
contributions over the past decade. A 
2009 study of a representative sample 
of public companies in the United States 
(US) showed that 96% had a blockholder 
and these blockholders owned 39% of the 
common stock in the sample.20 Moreover, 
it found that the ownership concentration 
level of US firms was similar to other 
countries in the world when taking firm size 
into account. 
This report will be useful primarily to families 
and, more generally, to practitioners whose 
work relates to family enterprises.
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2. Governance of the Family
The family is often characterized by multiple 
generations and multiple family branches. 
As time passes and more generations 
are added, there is less interaction 
among family members, a decline in 
common experiences and decreasing 
similarity. Unless steps are taken to 
hold family members together, they will 
tend to grow apart, thereby making the 
preservation of family norms, culture and 
legacy challenging. The multi-generation, 
multi-branch family often has multiple 
objectives, including: ensuring sustainability 
and prosperity of the family business; 
enabling family harmony and happiness 
among future generations; sustaining the 
family brand; maintaining control of the 
family business; managing succession 
of ownership, control and management; 
and mitigating family conflicts to maintain 
unity. To allow the family to realize these 
objectives, a customized family governance 
system, developed by the family and 
tailored to the context of the family, is 
needed. 
2.1 Foundations of Family 
Governance Systems 
The family governance system needs to be 
crafted so as to: 
 − Enable coordinated decision-making 
about common assets and their 
management
 − Enable orderly succession in ownership, 
management and control
 − Minimize interpersonal conflict within 
the family
 − Enable family harmony and happiness in 
future generations
 − Preserve and enhance family wealth 
 − Ensure sustainability and prosperity of 
the family business 
 − Enable long-term estate planning 
The family governance system includes 
intra-group and inter-group elements. Intra-
group elements refer to the governance of 
relationships and decision-making within 
the family. Inter-group elements refer to 
the relation between the family and the 
other family enterprise entities such as the 
family business, the family office and the 
family foundation. Figure 3 illustrates the 
foundations of a family governance system.
Family governance 
refers to the rules, 
processes and 
institutions that enable 
the decision-making and 
implementation of policies 
concerning the oversight 
and management of 
family affairs.
2.2 Informal Elements
As depicted in Figure 3, the base of a 
robust family governance system rests 
on intangible elements that belong to the 
sphere of family culture. Family culture can 
be seen as the system of shared values and 
norms that define appropriate attitudes and 
behaviours for family members.25 Values are 
concepts and beliefs that guide selection 
and evaluation of actions and events.26 
These shared values and norms may be 
related to different spheres: ethics, religion, 
environment, politics, justice and so on.
Figure 3: The Family Governance System
Recent research suggests that an important 
informal element of family governance is 
the “fairness perception” among family 
members.27 As per the fairness hypothesis, 
the fairness perceived by family members is 
both the main driver of happiness and the 
main deterrent of conflict, in that the degree 
to which family decisions are perceived to 
be fair shapes the individuals’ judgements 
and thus determines their behaviour. More 
specifically, individual fairness perception 
leads to higher satisfaction with family 
decisions and stronger identification with 
the family, and a fairness perception climate 
decreases family conflict, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.
Figure 4: How Perceptions of Fairness Impact Family Dynamics
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Therefore, families should build their 
institutions with the objective of promoting 
a sense of fairness. This can be done if one 
keeps in mind that fairness is fundamentally 
related to the idea of justice. Justice is 
thought of as taking three forms: distributive 
(fairness of outcomes), procedural (fairness 
of decision-making processes) and 
interactional (fairness of treatments). When 
family governance shows these three forms 
of justice, family members have a higher 
fairness perception, ultimately being more 
satisfied and less prone to conflict.
Beyond its benefits to family relationships, 
fairness has a positive effect on the family 
business, as suggested by a study centred 
on the impact of procedural justice on the 
family business.28 Defining a fair process 
as a construct that includes both a clear 
description of the steps and a precise 
characterization of each step, it outlines the 
following steps that a process has to go 
through to be seen as fair: 
1. Engaging with and framing the issue
2. Exploring and selecting the options
3. Deciding and explaining the reasons 
underlying the choice
4. Implementing and executing the chosen 
option
5. Evaluating the outcome and learning 
from it
Moreover, each step should be 
characterized by five qualities: 
communication, clarification, consistency, 
changeability and commitment to fairness. 
Drawing from case studies, the study 
discusses how the implementation of fair 
processes has a positive impact on the 
family firm. Fair process generates better 
solutions and the perception of positive 
results leads individuals to demand 
more fair process, activating a positively 
reinforcing cycle. On the other hand, the 
absence of fair process may prompt forms 
of redistributive justice, where individuals 
react to the perceived lack of fairness.
Family governance mechanisms may have 
an enduring effect on family members. 
Specifically, their characteristics affect 
the mindset and behaviour of the next 
generation of the family. The effect of two 
qualities of the family governance structure 
– family cohesion and family adaptability 
– on the attitude of the second generation 
forms the subject of a 2006 study of 
Chinese family firms.29 Family cohesion 
is defined as the degree of emotional 
closeness among family members, while 
family adaptability is defined as the degree 
to which the family is able to change its 
structure following situations of stress.30 
Based on survey data from 88 Chinese 
family firms, the study finds that family 
adaptability has strong effects on second-
generation members. Particularly, family 
adaptability is very positively related to 
commitment to the family enterprise, life 
satisfaction and job satisfaction. Moreover, 
commitment to the family enterprise and 
job satisfaction are negatively related to 
the propensity to leave. Interestingly, this 
research suggests that family cohesion 
does not have a significant effect on 
the attitude of second-generation family 
members. This in turn suggests that, 
regardless of family cohesion, designing 
an adaptable governance structure is 
important for the longevity of the family 
enterprise.
2.3 Formal Elements 
The formal elements of a multi-generational, 
multi-branch family ordinarily include: 
– Family Constitution: A morally binding 
document, it contains rules and 
regulations about coordinating decision-
making among family members. It 
generally contains information about 
the family mission, code of conduct, 
history, values, beliefs and norms, as 
well as the family’s mechanisms for 
conflict management and succession, 
its institutions including business 
institutions, and its employment, 
liquidity and exit policies. 
− Family Council: A forum of certain family 
members elected or appointed by the 
family, it is responsible for coordinating 
family decision-making and managing 
family affairs. 
– Family Assembly: A forum of all family 
members dedicated to preserving 
the family’s heritage, culture, norms 
and traditions, it also discusses family 
affairs. 
– Family Committees: Groups of elected 
or appointed family members, they 
are responsible for specific aspects of 
family life, such as education of family 
members and family philanthropy.  
The above governance structure emerges 
over time as the family grows beyond 
the first generation. The development of 
the formal governance structure is often 
visible in the second or third generation. 
Yet, the specific institutions depend on 
whether the family continues to own, 
control or manage in later generations the 
business or businesses founded by the 
first generation. In instances where the 
business is sold and family members share 
interests in common financial assets, a 
single family office, which includes a private 
asset-management organization, may be 
developed. The specific structure of the 
investment vehicles depends on a broad 
range of factors including estate plans and 
tax considerations. 
Broader environmental factors and 
societal trends also affect the evolution 
of family governance. Since the 1970s, 
families in Western societies have been 
changing, following two main patterns: 
increased individualism and increased 
democratization.31 An analysis of the 
evolution of family governance among 50 
Australian family firms finds that these two 
trends threaten the stability and continuity 
of the family. Families have been attempting 
to counter these trends by developing 
governance policies such as a family 
code of conduct, along with governance 
institutions and traditions that facilitate 
communication and negotiation, including 
family councils, family assemblies, family 
meetings and family retreats. 
Finally, the family governance structure is 
likely to have an impact on the family firm 
governance.32 Survey data from 192 family 
firms in Finland shows that the variety of 
family institutions is positively related to the 
degree of social interaction among family 
members, defined as the intensity of social 
ties among family members. Moreover, 
social interaction increases shared vision, 
and shared vision improves decision-
making in the family firm. Therefore, 
ultimately, the implementation of family 
governance institutions has a positive effect 
on the decision-making process in the 
family firm. 
2.4 Conflict Management
Conflict among family members can 
be highly detrimental to both the family 
and the family firm. Therefore, the family 
governance structure should be designed 
with the aim to minimize family conflict. 
The first question to ask is where family 
conflict comes from. Family conflict can be 
divided into two categories: family conflict 
concerning business and family conflict 
concerning personal relationships.33 Based 
on survey data, family conflict is positively 
related to three main variables: 
− Lack of clarity of business leadership
− Lack of procedural justice
− Resource distribution based on need or 
equity criteria, rather than on equality 
criteria
As expected, beyond threatening the 
happiness of the family, conflict can spill 
over into the family business. In particular, 
family conflict affects the family firm’s 
management team, causing anxiety, a 
stalemate in decision-making, lower levels 
of risk-taking, less information-sharing and 
reduced commitment.
Family conflict depends on the traits and 
characteristics of the family.34 Research 
suggests that family conflict increases 
down the generations. The presence of the 
founder in the business after having formally 
left control – the so-called “generation 
shadow” – significantly increases family 
conflict.35 There is evidence that greater 
family involvement in the business increases 
task conflict – the disagreement among 
family members over business affairs.36 
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Particularly, a higher number of family 
members involved in the daily business 
operations increases the frequency of 
conflict. Moreover, the degree of social 
interaction among family members 
increases the extent of conflict. These 
two results hold independently of which 
generation the family is currently at. 
A study on the specific strategies used by 
families to manage conflict identifies five 
conflict management strategies:37
− Competition (high concern for self, low 
concern for others)
− Collaboration (high concern for self, 
high concern for others) 
− Compromise (moderate concern for 
self, moderate concern for others) 
− Accommodation (low concern for self, 
high concern for others) 
− Avoidance (low concern for self, low 
concern for others) 
Competition involves strategically using 
information to manipulate others in 
order to reach the goal. Collaboration 
involves attempting to generate solutions 
satisfactory to all. Compromise involves 
reaching an agreement where all parties 
are moderately satisfied. Accommodation 
involves recognizing and fulfilling the desires 
of others. Avoidance involves refusing to 
face conflicts and address problems. 
The study finds evidence that the most 
successful strategy for both the family and 
the business is collaboration. Collaboration 
is the only conflict management strategy 
that seems to enhance both family 
objectives and business objectives at the 
same time. Conversely, the strategies 
that seem to deliver the worst outcomes 
for both the family and the business are 
competition and avoidance. Therefore, 
the study concludes that families should 
attempt to use a collaborative approach 
in managing conflicts. It is suggested 
that collaboration can be facilitated by 
the creation and enhancement of family 
governance institutions that encourage 
and support communication, such as 
family councils, family planning and family 
meetings. 
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3. Governance of the  
Family Firm
The standard perspective on corporate 
governance is based on the longstanding 
idea that the separation between ownership 
and management in a widely-held public 
corporation generates an agency problem 
due to the potential conflict of interest 
between owners and their agents, the 
managers of the firm. Yet in the context 
of family firms, there is another agency 
problem, namely, the potential conflict of 
interest between family shareholders and 
non-family shareholders. In what follows, 
six main aspects of family firm governance 
are discussed: ownership structure, control 
mechanisms, board of directors, executive 
compensation, dividend policy and 
succession.
Six key aspects of family 
firm governance are 
ownership structure, 
control mechanisms, 
board of directors, 
executive compensation, 
dividend policy and 
succession.
3.1 Ownership Structure
Ownership refers to the amount of firm 
equity owned by the shareholders, which 
reflects the right of the shareholders to 
the firm’s cash flows. The family can own 
equity in two ways: directly, by owning 
shares of the company with no intermediate 
entity; or indirectly, by owning one or more 
investment vehicles such as various types 
of trusts, foundations, corporations or 
partnerships. 
The choice between alternative ownership 
structures is guided by several factors 
including estate plans, liabilities protection, 
philanthropy, succession planning and 
tax considerations. Typically, family firms 
employ a combination of direct and indirect 
forms of ownership, as shown in Figure 5.
In multi-branch, multi-generational, family-
controlled firms, the ownership structure 
of the main family business may involve a 
range of intermediate entities and types of 
investment vehicles, as illustrated by the 
example in Figure 6. 
Figure 5: Example of Direct and Indirect Ownership
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009, Data as of 1994
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Among all US family firms in the Fortune 
500 from 1994 to 2000, the founding 
families owned on average 15.3% of 
their firms’ equity.38 When distinguishing 
between founder firms (family firms owned, 
controlled or managed by the founder) 
and later generation family firms (family 
firms owned, controlled or managed by 
second or later generation family members), 
the average ownership was 14.4% and 
16.1%, respectively. Direct ownership was 
the most prevalent structure: 96% of the 
sample firms were directly owned by their 
controlling families, for at least a fraction of 
the firm. However, direct ownership rarely 
accounted for the total family ownership 
of the firm: 80% of the family firms in the 
sample showed some form of indirect 
ownership. On average, 62% of the equity 
was directly owned by a family with the 
balance 38% owned indirectly through 
some investment vehicle. The most 
prevalent investment vehicles were trusts 
(present in 66% of the sample firms) and 
foundations (present in 37% of the sample 
firms). 
The evidence of the use of indirect 
ownership is confirmed in Europe. A 2007 
study of the ownership structure of family 
firms in Spain, based on a sample of 195 
firms listed in the Spanish stock markets, 
found 53.9% of all firms and 72.5% of 
closely-held firms having some form of 
indirect ownership.39 This confirms the use 
of indirect ownership in family firms, given 
that family firms represent 43.1% of all firms 
and 59.2% of closely-held firms. 
Figure 6: Example of Complex Ownership Structure 
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009, Data as of 1996
Legend: O = ownership; V = votes 
3.2 Control Mechanisms
Control typically refers to the way the 
shareholder can influence the direction of 
the firm. The literature has discerned three 
main measures of control:
1. Votes owned: the number of votes at 
the shareholders’ meeting associated 
with the shares owned by the 
shareholder. 
2. Votes controlled: the number of votes at 
the shareholders’ meeting controlled by 
the shareholder. 
3. Board seats controlled: the number 
of seats in the board of directors 
controlled by the shareholder. 
A common characteristic of family firms is 
the wedge between ownership and control; 
namely, the voting control that the family 
has, through one or more mechanisms, 
in excess of its ownership. The difference 
between ownership and control can be 
computed through the framework illustrated 
in Figure 7.40 It depicts the wedge between:
− Votes owned vs. shares owned
− Votes controlled vs. votes owned
− Board seats controlled vs. votes 
controlled
− Board seats controlled vs. shares 
owned
 
Figure 7: Measuring Voting Rights When They Differ from Cash Flow Rights
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009
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The existence of the wedge between 
control and ownership enables the 
controlling shareholder to benefit in some 
way at the expense of other shareholders. 
This is commonly referred to as 
appropriation of private benefits of control. 
Family firms have been shown to deploy 
one or more of the following control-
enhancing mechanisms:
– Dual-class stock: Issuance of shares 
of different classes, where one class is 
associated with superior voting rights. 
– Pyramidal structure: An ownership 
structure whereby a focal firm owns a 
fraction of another firm through a chain 
of ownership relations. 
– Cross-holding: An ownership structure 
whereby a lower-tier company in a 
pyramidal structure owns equity in its 
owner, an upper-tier company in the 
ownership chain. 
– Voting agreement: A contractual 
arrangement through which different 
shareholders pool their votes to reach a 
common objective. 
Multiple studies have investigated what 
mechanisms firms use to achieve the 
wedge between ownership and control, 
where control is defined as the number of 
votes controlled. A study of US firms finds 
that the most prevalent mechanism is dual-
class stock (21% of the sample).41 Voting 
agreements, pyramidal structures and 
cross-holdings are either marginally relevant 
or irrelevant among the sample firms of this 
study. Most importantly, there is evidence 
of a substantial wedge between ownership 
and control. On average, family firms show 
a ratio between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights of 1:28. 
In another study focusing on Western 
Europe, a dataset comprising 5,232 
corporations from 13 Western European 
countries was examined.42 It found that 
family firms use mostly dual-class stock 
(17.61% of the sample) and pyramidal 
structures (13.81%). This is different from 
firms controlled by either the state or a 
financial institution: in the latter, the most 
frequently used mechanism was pyramidal 
structure. While this study gives no 
information on the wedge between control 
and ownership specific to family firms, 
across all firms in the sample the average 
wedge was 1:15. The wedge was higher in 
Switzerland (1:35), Italy (1:35) and Norway 
(1:29), and lower in Spain (1:06), Portugal 
(1:08) and France (1:08). However, the 
concentration of family control, gauged by 
measuring the average number of firms 
controlled by a single family, showed that 
such concentration was higher in Italy, 
Norway and Sweden with, respectively, 
1:46, 1:29 and 1:27 firms under control. 
Finally, a study on the same issue in East 
Asia, which analysed a dataset of 2,980 
firms from nine East Asian countries, 
found that in the overall sample firms used 
mostly pyramidal structures (38.7% of the 
sample) and cross-holdings (10.1% of the 
sample).43 However, it gave no information 
on the most used mechanisms specifically 
among family firms. There was no evidence 
of use of shares with superior voting rights. 
In most countries, family firms had larger 
separation between ownership and control 
compared with other firms. On average, 
these firms achieved a positive wedge 
between voting rights and cash-flow rights: 
higher in Indonesia (1:46), Singapore (1:39) 
and Taiwan (1:32), and lower in Japan 
(1:02), Thailand (1:09) and South Korea 
(1:20).
As stated, in many countries the most 
prevalent mechanism to achieve control in 
excess of ownership is dual-class stock. 
Dual-class stock involves controlling a 
firm through the trading of at least two 
classes of shares, where one class has 
higher voting power. An analysis of a 
comprehensive dataset of US dual-class 
firms during the period 1995-2002 confirms 
the relevance of this control structure.44  It 
finds that 6% of the firms and 8% of the 
market capitalization in the sample used 
dual-class shares. In this subset, 85% 
had at least one traded share class that 
generally had superior voting power. 
The study examines what induces a firm 
to engage in the use of dual-class stock. 
Its hypothesis is that firms choose this 
control structure if, before the initial public 
offering (IPO), expected benefits (the 
private benefits of control enabled by the 
wedge between voting rights and cash-
flow rights) exceed expected costs (the 
discount at which the inferior shares are 
likely to trade in the future). Therefore, the 
firms test the relation between the choice 
of using dual-class stock and proxies of 
the expectation of net benefits. Specifically, 
this study finds that having the founder’s 
name in the company name is a strong 
predictor of choosing dual-class stock and 
is particularly common among family firms.
Another important mechanism is the 
pyramidal structure, which defines an 
ownership structure where a firm controls 
another firm not directly but through a chain 
of intermediate ownership relations. The 
diagram in Figure 8 provides an example.
Figure 8: Example of Pyramidal  
Structure
Source: Villalonga and Amit, 2009
What drives the existence of these 
ownership structures, going beyond the 
standard argument based on the search for 
control in excess of ownership? One study 
examines an environment with low investor 
protection where a family owns a firm and is 
about to set up another.45 In this situation, 
the family has to choose the ownership 
structure of the newly created business 
group: either horizontal (the new firm is 
owned directly by the family) or pyramidal 
(the new firm is owned, in part, by an 
upper-tier existing firm). With low investor 
protection, the family is able to divert 
cash flow among its entities. This makes 
the pyramid more attractive as it creates 
a financing advantage. If such financing 
explanation is right, it seems probable that 
a firm with low access to external financing 
is more likely to be controlled through a 
pyramidal structure. 
There is convincing evidence for this 
explanation from empirical analysis. 
One study used a dataset of 28,635 
firms across 45 countries to test the 
financing explanation of pyramidal 
structure formation, and found that at the 
country level, external capital availability 
is negatively associated with pyramid 
formation.46 At the firm level, it found that 
firms in pyramidal structures are more 
investment-intensive, younger and riskier, 
which makes it harder for them to raise 
external capital. 
Disproportionate board representation is 
another control mechanism widely used 
by family firms. This defines the situation 
where families have the right to elect 
board members in excess of both their 
cash-flow rights and their voting rights. 
Disproportionate board representation is 
largely frequent in US family firms, being 
present in 60% of the sample of one 
study.47 Among firms where the fraction of 
the board control exceeds ownership, the 
average difference between board rights 
and control rights is 10%, the study found.
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Finally, family control may be related to 
the price of family firms’ stock at IPO. 
Issuing underpriced shares has the effect 
of favouring oversubscription, meaning 
that the demand exceeds the total number 
of shares available. This allows the owner 
to decide to which buyers to allocate the 
shares and what amounts to allocate 
them. The family may be willing to use 
this strategy to ensure diffused external 
shareholdings and avoid large blockholders. 
This may be attractive to the family, since 
one large external blockholder could 
monitor the family’s activity, complicating 
the potential appropriation of private 
benefits. Based on such motivation, it has 
been hypothesized that family involvement 
in the firm is positively related to the degree 
of IPO underpricing.48 A sample of IPOs 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange shows 
that firms with strong family involvement 
pursue more IPO underpricing than firms 
with low family involvement.
3.3 Board of Directors
The board of directors is a central element 
of the governance structure of any 
firm, private or public. Its main role is to 
monitor the management on behalf of the 
shareholders and ensure that management 
actions are in the shareholders’ best 
interest. This includes both controlling 
and advising the managers’ activities. In 
the context of the family firm, the board is 
expected to represent the interests of both 
the family blockholders and the non-family 
shareholders.
The board should make two contributions 
to the firm:49 
– Overseeing the managerial activity 
(monitoring) 
– Offering expertise, knowledge and 
support to the management (resource 
provision)
Two characteristics of the board are taken 
into account: board dependence (the 
degree to which the board is subordinated 
to the management) and board capital (the 
sum of directors’ human and social capital). 
It is suggested that:
– Family power influences positively 
the dependence of the board and 
negatively the capital of the board. 
– Board dependence is negatively related 
to monitoring, and board capital is 
positively associated with resource 
provision.  
– Therefore, family power impacts 
negatively both functions of the board: 
the more powerful the family in the firm, 
the less helpful the board.  
However, the negative relation between 
family power and board performance 
is moderated by two important factors: 
family culture and family experience. When 
these two forces are conducive, family 
power has a less detrimental effect on the 
board’s performance. Ultimately, this model 
suggests that the board’s performance 
depends on family characteristics, such 
as family power, family culture and family 
experience. Therefore, there is no unique 
board structure that may be optimal for 
all family firms; the board needs to be 
structured based on the specific family 
context.
While there is no single best structure of 
a family firm’s board of directors, there 
is broad support for the importance of 
board independence, as the presence of 
independent directors on the board reduces 
the risk of appropriation of private benefits. 
The importance of board independence 
has stimulated a range of studies centred 
on the relation of board independence to 
firm-level and country-level characteristics. 
One study of board independence in 
relation to firm ownership concentration 
and country legal environment, using data 
on 229 firms from 14 European countries, 
finds that when ownership concentration is 
greater, boards are less independent. It also 
finds that boards are more independent 
where legal protection is greater. Therefore, 
when firm ownership is concentrated or a 
country’s legal environment is weak, the 
board is unable to fully exercise its control 
function, creating room for the family 
blockholder to extract resources from 
minority shareholders. 
3.4 Executive Compensation
The founding family often has substantial 
power in determining executive 
compensation. This may be a complex 
issue, particularly when the family firm is 
led by a non-family CEO. In such a case, 
the compensation scheme has to cope 
with potential incentive conflicts and 
time-horizon differences between the two 
parties. Executive compensation typically 
includes monetary and non-monetary 
rewards. It includes salary, short-term 
incentives (such as bonuses) and long-term 
incentives (such as stock options).
The main question concerns what elements 
drive the family decision-making process 
when it comes to establishing executive 
compensation. A sample of 253 US family 
public corporations during 1995-1998 
shows the existence of a compensation 
discount for family CEOs compared to 
non-family CEOs: family members leading 
the firm are paid less than their non-family 
counterparts.50 This compensation gap 
increases when the family ownership is 
higher: family ownership concentration 
decreases family CEO pay and increases 
non-family CEO pay. Moreover, the 
compensation discount decreases when 
systemic risk is higher – high systemic risk 
increases family CEO pay and decreases 
non-family CEO pay. The combination of 
these facts suggests that the family affects 
family CEO compensation, not through 
higher pay, but mostly through greater 
risk protection. Finally, the presence of an 
external institutional blockholder in the firm 
decreases the long-term incentive for the 
family CEO. This fact supports the view that 
institutional investors may avoid long-term 
incentives for the family CEO for reasons 
related to risk: a higher long-term incentive 
would exacerbate the CEO’s risk-aversion, 
which in the family context is already 
likely to be strong. This would lead to a 
suboptimal risk profile and negatively affect 
firm performance.
As discussed, the most relevant agency 
problem in the family firm context is 
the incentive conflict between family 
blockholder and non-family shareholders. 
CEO compensation is one of the 
instruments the family may exploit to 
extract private benefits. A study of the 
relation between CEO ownership and 
CEO compensation using a sample of 412 
public corporations in Hong Kong during 
the period 1995-1998 finds managerial 
ownership of up to 35% to be positively 
related to CEO compensation among small 
firms.51 Among large firms, managerial 
ownership of up to 10% is positively 
related to CEO compensation. In general, 
the lack of managerial ownership is 
negatively related to CEO compensation. 
These results provide evidence that the 
owner-managers may use their position to 
determine a higher personal salary. This 
confirms the idea that family CEOs may 
be using this channel to extract benefits 
for themselves, at the expense of other 
shareholders.
Families may also try to alleviate the 
incentive conflict with non-family 
shareholders – especially in situations 
where such risk is higher. Also, certain 
control-enhancing mechanisms put the 
family in a position to extract private 
benefits. One of these instruments is dual-
class stock. An investigation of the relation 
between dual-class stock and executive 
compensation in a sample of Canadian 
public companies between 1998 and 2006 
finds evidence that family executives are 
paid more in dual-class family firms than in 
single-class family firms.52 However, most 
of this compensation is incentive-based: 
stock options and bonuses. This suggests 
that the extra compensation in dual-class 
firms may have the objective of aligning the 
incentives of the owner-manager with those 
of the minority shareholders. This is a way 
to mitigate the possibility of private benefits 
appropriation generated by the additional 
control of dual-class stock. 
18 A Primer on Governance of the Family Enterprise
Finally, consider the case in which the 
family chooses to hire a non-family CEO. In 
this situation, a particularly complex issue 
concerns how the family should pay the 
non-family CEO: family and professional 
managers typically differ in preferences, risk 
profiles and time horizons. Drawing from 
classical contract theory, the short-term 
incentives to be offered to a non-family 
CEO should be low in the following cases: 
when the CEO is interested in signalling 
performance of executives to the outside 
market; when the CEO’s effort to improve 
short-term performance is hard to observe; 
when the CEO is considerably risk-averse; 
and when the CEO is more sensitive to 
incentives. Since family CEOs are less 
motivated to signal their performance to the 
executive market and are likely to manage 
the firm in the long-term, they are less 
responsive to short-term incentives. Thus, 
the effect of short-term incentives is more 
intense for non-family CEOs. This suggests 
that the compensation schemes for family 
managers should include higher short-term 
incentives, in order to reinforce the family 
CEO’s incentive to perform well in the short 
term. 
3.5 Dividend Policy
The family can use dividends to either 
compensate for – or take advantage of – its 
controlling position in the firm. Therefore, 
dividend policy may alleviate or exacerbate 
the conflict between family blockholder and 
non-family shareholders.
The wedge between ownership and control 
can be seen as a proxy for how much 
the firm is subject to the risk of having a 
controlling blockholder appropriate private 
benefits of control, as discussed in Section 
3.2. A study of the way firms use dividend 
policy, using a sample of public companies 
from Europe and East Asia, identifies some 
interesting facts.53 First, firms pay higher 
dividends when they are tightly affiliated 
with a business group and when they have 
a stronger wedge between ownership 
and control. This suggests that affiliated 
firms tend to use dividends to alleviate 
the investors’ expectation of potential 
appropriation of private benefits. In fact, 
there is no evidence of this phenomenon 
for loosely affiliated firms: in that case, 
shareholders perceive a lower risk for 
appropriation. Second, among corporations 
affiliated with a business group and with 
a positive wedge, European firms pay 
higher dividends than East Asian firms. This 
suggests that European investors are more 
aware of the potential for expropriation, 
inducing European firms to be more willing 
to use such a compensation mechanism. 
Since family firms are generally affiliated 
with business groups, this study suggests 
that families do use the dividend policy to 
offset the effect of potential conflict with 
minority shareholders. Moreover, the degree 
to which this instrument is used depends 
on the degree of financial development of 
the economy.
The literature examining the dividend 
policy of family firms has reported mixed 
evidence. Part of the literature suggests 
that family firms pay lower dividends than 
non-family firms. A study on a sample 
of Spanish firms finds that family firms 
pay around 40% lower dividends than 
non-family firms and this difference is 
statistically significant.54 This may increase 
tension with other family shareholders 
and decrease family firm attractiveness 
to outside investors. However, another 
part of the literature offers contradicting 
evidence. A study of the dividend policy of 
family firms using a sample of European 
corporations finds that family firms pay 
higher and more stable dividends than non-
family firms.55 Moreover, family firms with a 
non-family second blockholder pay higher 
dividends than family firms without such 
a second blockholder. Also, family firms 
with no separation between ownership and 
control pay higher dividends than families 
where the wedge is positive. Overall, this 
contribution supports the idea that family 
firms pay higher dividends, suggesting an 
attitude to compensate for the potential 
agency problem. 
The dividend decision has to be considered 
in the broader context of the firm’s financial 
management. In fact, a firm’s dividend 
policy varies depending on other firms’ 
policies.56 In particular, the relation between 
dividends and board independence is 
negative among family firms and positive 
among non-family firms. This shows that 
there is a strong interdependence between 
these two policies. Such interaction differs 
between family firms and non-family firms. 
Family firms use these two governance 
mechanisms as substitutes: when the 
board is not independent, the firm pays 
higher dividends to compensate for that, 
and vice versa. In contrast, non-family 
firms use these two governance tools as 
complementary. 
Thus, there is evidence for the idea that 
families use dividends to alleviate the 
agency problem with minority shareholders, 
which is perceived to be more salient when 
the board is not independent.
3.6 Succession
The succession decision is a crucial step 
for the family firm. This process concerns 
whether and how to transfer the family 
firm’s ownership, control and management 
to the next generation. There is substantial 
evidence to show that families often prefer 
to transfer their business to their offspring. 
It is often assumed that such behaviour is 
simply the manifestation of some form of 
nepotism. However, the literature suggests 
there is much more involved.
One common argument posits that the 
major determinant of the succession 
outcome is the legal environment where 
the family firm is located.57 Considering 
the standard typology of a founding family 
firm – one that is owned and managed 
by its founder – when the transition is 
approaching, the founder has to make 
a decision regarding ownership, control 
and management of the firm. In particular, 
the founder can choose the next CEO 
from potential family heirs or appoint a 
professional, who is assumed to be a better 
manager.
This decision depends on the extent that 
the law protects minority shareholders:58 
– In a strong legal protection environment, 
the founder would hire the professional 
as CEO and sell the firm in the stock 
market. 
– In a weak legal protection environment, 
the founder would choose the family 
heir as CEO and keep the firm 
ownership. 
– In an intermediate legal protection 
environment, the founder would hire 
the professional as CEO but keep a 
controlling stake in the firm.  
This last case, perhaps the most common 
in many Western countries, is a situation 
that involves two agency problems: 
the conflict between management and 
shareholders and the conflict between 
family blockholders and non-family 
shareholders.
An alternative argument suggests that 
the choice of transferring the family 
firm to a family heir may be motivated 
by an economic rationale that centres 
on the specificity of the family firm’s 
assets. Typically, the family firm’s most 
crucial assets – its human and social 
capital – are rather individual-specific and 
idiosyncratic. Consider a founder having 
to choose the next CEO between the 
family heir and an outsider. The founder 
can hire the professional for one period 
and then re-evaluate that decision. The 
main consideration in this decision is the 
so-called appropriation of risk: should the 
skilled manager be hired for one period 
or for a longer period? The issue here 
is that once the manager acquires the 
idiosyncratic knowledge, they may use that 
knowledge to bargain for a higher level of 
compensation from the founder. Hence, 
the founder is trapped in a dilemma: hiring 
a skilled professional manager, both firm 
profitability and appropriation risk would 
increase, making it unclear whether or not 
this would be the best choice to make.59
This dilemma may motivate the founder 
to transfer the firm leadership to a family 
heir who may be less skilled at managing 
the firm, in particular when performance 
depends on idiosyncratic knowledge. In 
fact, in such a case, the founder would 
perceive a very high appropriation risk and 
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be willing to trade it off with the initial lower 
profitability caused by the lower ability of 
the family heir. This dynamic explains why 
families often choose their heirs to lead 
their firms, without relying on the usual 
nepotism argument. Therefore, this study 
suggests that founders should carefully 
take into account the appropriation risk, 
since family firms are known to depend 
profoundly on idiosyncratic knowledge. 
Finally, in the extreme case where the heir 
is poorly qualified, the authors suggest 
that the family should undertake what is 
known as the seat-warmer strategy: hiring 
a professional temporarily, even if having 
to pay a premium in compensating the 
professional, until a suitable heir is available 
to lead the firm.
In addition to addressing what motivates 
families to retain control of the business 
across generations, there is need to 
question the best way to do so. Using a 
case-study approach to identify the features 
characterizing the successful transfer of 
the family business to the offspring, five 
ways have been identified through which 
successful transitions have taken place:60 
– The heir voluntarily took the lead of the 
family firm
– The family explicitly requested the heir 
to succeed to the helm of the firm 
– The heir chose to take the lead out of a 
sense of moral duty 
– The transfer was implicitly 
predetermined and there was no need 
to make any explicit request
– The family softly pushed the heir to take 
control of the firm
Six steps that can be taken to better 
prepare for the transition are summarized in 
Figure 9.61 
One study classifies the drivers of effective 
family succession into three categories:62 
the preparation of the heir; the nature of 
the relationships among family members; 
and the planning and control activity in the 
family firm. Based on econometric analysis 
of survey data, it finds that the transition 
occurs more smoothly when heirs are more 
accurately prepared, when the firm does 
considerable planning activity, and when 
family relationships are based on trust and 
affability. Among these three elements, the 
main driving force is the nature of family 
relationships. Therefore, this study suggests 
that families should strive to develop and 
maintain relationships based on trust 
and affability among members; not only 
will such effort be beneficial in the short 
run, it will also be critical at the moment 
of passing the business on to the next 
generation.
Figure 9: Six Steps to Prepare for a Successful Succession
Source: Adapted from Lambrecht, 2005
1. Involve the heir in the business very early
2. Have the heir undertake studies related to the business
3. Provide the heir with internal education tailored to initiate her into an 
understanding of the business
4. Encourage the heir to gain work experience in other companies 
5. Officially introduce the heir into the business
6. Regulate the debut of the heir into the family business by a written 
agreement 
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Multi-generation, multi-branch family 
enterprises often establish a family office 
and a family foundation. These two entities 
play a vitally important role in family life 
and therefore require the development of 
appropriate governance structures. Since 
governance issues associated with these 
entities have only been sparsely studied, a 
short review is provided below.
 
4. Governance of Other  
Family Entities
4.1 Family Office
As the family grows in size and complexity, 
and its business flourishes, family members 
increasingly face the need for wealth 
management, broadly defined. Substantial 
families with investable assets in excess of 
US$ 100 million often choose to set up their 
own family office, which is a professional 
organization dedicated to serving the 
financial and personal needs of the family. 
While family offices vary in size and scope, 
their mandate includes managing the 
liquid wealth of family members (i.e. those 
financial assets that are not tied to the 
family-controlled operating company), 
serving as the administrative backbone of 
the family enterprise and providing a range 
of services to the family. 
Specifically, the services offered by a family 
office fall into three broad categories:
– Investment management services, 
including asset allocation, manager 
selection, manager monitoring and 
performance measurement.
– Administrative services, including 
technology support, financial 
information aggregation, financial 
record-keeping, compliance, 
accounting and banking.
– Family-related services, including estate 
planning to manage tax-efficient inter-
generational wealth transfer, education 
programmes for younger family 
members, risk management, insurance, 
concierge services and security. 
Some of these services are provided 
in-house by professionals who are 
hired by the family office under various 
specializations such as investment, finance, 
accounting and legal, while other services 
are outsourced to external vendors. It is 
common for a family member to lead the 
family office. 
There are potential vulnerabilities in the 
family office and sources of risk for the 
family therein.63 Family offices are subject 
to three types of risk: financial (such as 
cash misappropriation and inaccurate 
book-keeping), technology-related (such as 
information theft and technical problems in 
the system) and employment-related (such 
as payroll fraud and tax issues). Therefore, 
an effective set of internal controls must 
be incorporated into the family office 
governance – internal processes designed 
to identify and mitigate these risks, allowing 
the family office to achieve its objectives. 
Families with substantial 
investable assets in 
excess of US$ 100 million 
often choose to set up 
their own family office - a 
professional organization 
dedicated to serving the 
financial and personal 
needs of the family.
The most effective internal controls fall into 
five main classes:
1. Governance practices reflecting the 
family standards with respect to ethics
2. Procedures regulating and limiting 
access to family funds
3. Practices supporting the segregation of 
duties
4. Processes for conducting frequent 
reconciliations
5. Practices of documenting all significant 
transactions 
A recent benchmarking study of family 
offices provides insights on the drivers of 
family office performance, based on survey 
data from a sample of 106 single family 
offices (SFOs) located in 24 countries.64 The 
majority of families in this sample operate 
a family business in addition to managing 
their wealth through the SFO. American 
family offices seem to be more versatile 
than their European counterparts: the 
former emphasize non-financial services 
(administrative and family-related) more 
than the latter. What emerges from the 
benchmarking study overall is that high-
performing SFOs share several best 
practices, as listed in Figure 10.
 
Figure 10: Best Practices of Single-Family Offices
Source: Amit and Liechtenstein, 2012
– Expanded capabilities to handle key activities in-house
– Significant number of family members involved
– Superior governance and control structure 
– Detailed documentation of every activity within the family office
– Codified investment-management processes
– Extensive and frequent communication with family members
– State-of-the-art human capital processes and compensation practices 
– Education programmes for younger generations
– Succession planning 
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A study examining Swiss family offices 
highlights the important roles of family office 
boards, which are a central element of the 
governance structure of family offices.65 The 
board should be responsible for setting the 
overall direction of the family office as well 
as monitoring its activities. The composition 
of the family office board should reflect 
diverse skills and backgrounds. There 
should be clearly defined roles for its 
members, who should be integrated 
into the activities of the family office as 
well as of the family members and other 
stakeholders. The functioning of the family 
office and the performance of its board 
depend on a culture of trust, which has a 
major role in minimizing conflict, enabling 
conflict resolution and allowing a smooth 
monitoring process.
 
4.2 Family Foundation
The family foundation is the entity through 
which the family enterprise carries out its 
philanthropic activities in a tax-efficient 
manner. Typically, the family foundation is 
a private foundation, which is supported 
by the family, the family business and its 
investment income. Its main activity is 
providing grants according to its mission. 
Although foundations play a crucial role in 
many developed countries, the study of 
family foundations is still at its early stages 
and the literature has not yet produced as 
many insights on this subject as on other 
aspects of the family enterprise. 
The family foundation 
can be very beneficial 
for the family for reasons 
beyond tax reduction and 
reputation.
The family foundation can be very beneficial 
for the family for reasons beyond tax 
reduction and reputation. Mainly, the family 
foundation can have three positive effects 
on family dynamics by:66
– providing financial education
– enhancing family communication
– enabling a larger family discussion
The family foundation offers an excellent 
opportunity for family members to learn 
about financial and investment issues, 
serving as a platform for the older 
generation to mentor the new generation 
on issues such as due diligence, valuation 
and investment strategy. Moreover, family 
foundations provide additional occasions 
for the family to meet, thereby enhancing 
communication among family members. 
Finally, family foundations have the effect of 
enlarging the discussion within the family, 
putting emphasis on issues that would 
otherwise remain understated.
To maintain its tax exemption, the family 
foundation needs to distribute about 5% 
of its market value for charitable purposes 
each year. A key governance decision for 
family foundations is how to carry out their 
grant-making activity – give it directly to 
the receiving subject or indirectly through 
another organization. Family foundations 
typically prefer to fund charitable activities 
indirectly by funding other charitable 
organizations.
The main governance institution of family 
foundations is usually a governing board. 
Typically, numerous family members 
serve on the board, including the 
founding donor.67 The board can also 
include non-family members, particularly 
representatives from the community. The 
board meets at various times every year 
to review the foundation’s activities and 
direction, particularly grant proposals and 
investment performance. The majority of 
family foundation board members are often 
volunteers, so they typically receive only 
an expense reimbursement. Four main 
foundation structure models – trustee, 
administrator, director and presidential – are 
described in Figure 11.68 
A key governance decision for the family 
foundation – similar to the family firm 
– concerns hiring outsiders. As family 
foundations grow, family members may 
no longer be willing or suitable to lead the 
family foundation, so families tend to hire 
outside administrators. The non-family 
administrator is likely to lead the foundation 
to a new stage of its existence, changing 
its previous processes and dynamics. As 
such, the non-family administrator may offer 
three important contributions:69
1. Bringing in a new level of professional 
management
2. Enhancing the relationship between the 
foundation and the community
3. Bringing a fresh and objective 
perspective into the family
Figure 11: Four Models of Family Foundation Structure
Source: Adapted from Brody and Strauch, 1990
– Trustee model: There is no additional staff and the board also 
performs daily administration
– Administrator model: A small staff is hired to perform daily 
administration, while the board makes decisions
– Director model: An executive director guides the board activity
– Presidential model: The board sets policies and monitors progress, 
while an administrator has wide authority
 
Since the foundation is often a small entity, 
the relationship between the family and 
the administrator is key to the foundation’s 
performance. A close relationship is 
desirable, but if it becomes too close, 
there is a possibility that the administrator 
becomes subordinate to the family and 
fails to bring objectivity and expertise to the 
foundation’s decisions. This will obviously 
harm the foundation’s performance.
Finally, family foundations have to make the 
choice between diversification and focus in 
their grant-making strategy. Diversification 
in grant-making may require professional 
skills only available outside.  This may not 
be accepted by family members and may 
create conflict within the family. 
A study of the drivers of this decision-
making process using a sample of the 200 
largest independent foundations in the US 
finds a number of interesting results:70
– Family foundations are significantly less 
diversified than non-family foundations.
– The board size is positively related to 
diversification.
– Later generation foundations are more 
diversified.
– Family foundations with lower family 
control on their boards are more 
diversified.
The combination of these facts confirms 
that the family presence tends to be 
an obstacle towards grant-making 
diversification.
Family foundations play an increasingly 
important and visible role in both traditional 
areas of philanthropy and innovative 
research and development (R&D) initiatives. 
It is hoped that future research on family 
foundations will yield new insights on 
this important component of the family 
enterprise.
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5. Governance and 
Performance
The relation between the governance 
architecture of the family enterprise and 
economic performance is important 
to understand how each aspect of the 
governance system may differentially 
impact the performance of a family entity. 
By reviewing the relation between each 
governance element and performance, an 
attempt is made to infer best practices to 
be shared with family enterprises.
Researchers find strong 
evidence that the use 
of family governance 
practices enhances the 
financial success of the 
firm.
5.1 Family and Performance
While common wisdom suggests that the 
family affects performance only through 
the role it plays in its business, empirical 
evidence suggests that family composition 
and size per se have a profound effect 
on performance. A study of the effect of 
family structure on family firm performance 
using data from 93 Thai family business 
groups finds a significantly negative relation 
between the number of sons and firm 
performance.71 This relation is mitigated 
to some extent during the lifetime of the 
founder, and appears stronger in those 
firms where the founder has passed away. 
The number of daughters also has a 
negative effect on performance, although 
this is weaker. Hence, family size seems to 
adversely affect performance, suggesting 
that family size may provide incentives to 
extract resources from the firm, thereby 
generating conflict.
Family processes also affect performance. 
Using survey data on US firms, an analysis 
of how family relations and processes 
impact performance, as measured by firm 
revenues, shows that family tension has a 
strong negative impact on performance.72 
The data also suggests that there is a 
positive relation between family members 
working in the company and performance. 
Considering the effect of the so-called 
disruptive variables, the study finds that 
shifting time from the family to the business 
is positively related to performance. 
Conversely, using family money for the 
firm, or skipping a business task in order 
to spend time with the family, and having 
occasional free labour from family members 
in the business, are all negatively related to 
performance.
Family governance can mitigate family 
tension, as discussed in Section 2. 
Therefore, family governance mechanisms 
should have a relevant effect on 
performance, given the link between 
family tension and performance. A study 
of six family governance practices – family 
constitution, family code of conduct, 
clear selection and accountability criteria, 
family councils, family reunions and family 
communication tools – to examine their 
effect on family firm performance shows 
that family governance reinforces family 
ties, building a unified team with common 
preferences and goals.73 A unified team is 
likely to lead to enhanced performance. 
Based on survey data on 94 family firms 
from 18 countries around the world, the 
study finds strong evidence that the use of 
family governance practices enhances the 
financial success of the firm.
The succession decision is a key dilemma 
in the family enterprise. Much evidence 
suggests that families tend to prefer to 
keep control of the firm across generations. 
Stewardship theory further suggests that 
the intention to keep the business within 
the family may have a positive effect on 
performance.75 Families intending to pass 
their business on to the next generation will: 
− have a more forward-looking approach 
in their business decisions
− make an effort to build reputation and 
social capital
− invest in business education and 
apprenticeship of family members, and 
develop a strong organizational culture
−   build a strong relationship with the 
professional managers, so that they will 
support a new family member who will 
eventually lead the enterprise
This combination of practices – driven by 
the intention of keeping the business within 
the family – will have a positive effect on 
long-term performance.  
5.2 Family Ownership and 
Performance 
The common perception is that family 
ownership is not a value-maximizing 
ownership structure. However, an analysis 
of the relation between family ownership 
and family firm performance using a sample 
of 403 US family firms between 1992 and 
1999 finds that family firms outperform 
non-family firms in both accounting and 
market measures of performance.76 It finds 
that the relation between family ownership 
and performance is similar to an inverse-
U-shape: it increases as family ownership 
increases, but decreases after a certain 
point. 
An empirical examination of all Fortune 500 
firms between 1994 and 2000, looking 
at the impact on performance of family 
ownership, management and control, 
establishes that family ownership per se 
creates value for the firm.77
A large body of literature has studied a 
separate but related problem: the effect 
of insider ownership – the ownership of 
the firm by managers or board members 
– on performance. An analysis of data on 
US firms during the period 1994-1999 to 
investigate how insider ownership affects 
firm value supports the idea of an inverse-
U-shaped relation: insider ownership 
increases performance at moderate levels, 
but decreases it at excessive levels.78 
This evidence of the positive effect of family 
ownership on performance is confirmed 
by a number of studies focusing on 
different regions of the world. Canadian 
family firms’ performance is not worse in 
market terms, and is better in accounting 
terms, than that of non-family firms.79 A 
sample of 675 public companies from 
11 European countries finds that family 
ownership positively affects performance.80 
An examination of 1,672 firms from 13 
European countries finds that family 
ownership is associated with a 7% higher 
valuation and 16% higher profitability.81 
Finally, a study of data from 1,301 public 
companies from eight East Asian countries 
also finds family ownership positively related 
to value.82 
Corporate transparency refers to the 
degree to which shareholders have easy 
access to all information regarding the firm 
and is an important monitoring device. In 
family firms, family members might be in a 
position to effectively determine the level 
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of corporate transparency. They could 
have the incentive to diminish it, in order to 
extract private benefits from the firm more 
easily. Alternatively, transparency could just 
be diminished because it would become 
less useful when family members would 
directly serve the function of monitoring 
the management. Opacity plays a key 
role in determining the performance of 
family-owned firms – family firms are 
significantly more opaque than widely-held 
corporations, as a study using a sample 
of 2,000 US public companies shows.83 
Most importantly, opacity plays a key role 
in the relation between family ownership 
and performance. In fact, family ownership 
affects performance positively only among 
firms with low levels of opacity. As opacity 
increases, family ownership decreases 
performance. This evidence suggests 
that the positive relation between family 
ownership and family firm performance 
is conditional on the family firm being 
transparent. If the firm is not transparent, 
the market perceives that the family may be 
extracting resources from the firm.
Finally, the literature has highlighted the role 
of the environment in the relation between 
family ownership and performance. The 
environment may affect firms mainly 
through two channels: the cultural 
channel and the institutional channel. The 
first domain includes values and norms 
traditionally embedded in the behaviour of 
individuals. The second domain concerns 
characteristics of market development 
and the legal framework. Therefore, 
environmental characteristics may bias our 
results about the relation between family 
ownership and family firm performance. A 
sample of Chinese firms – chosen because 
China is seen as an appropriate location 
characterized by cultural homogeneity and 
institutional heterogeneity across provinces, 
allowing for isolation of the institutional 
effect from the cultural effect – confirms 
that family ownership is positively related 
to performance.84 However, this relation is 
only strong in regions with low institutional 
efficiency. This finding suggests that family 
ownership is the optimal structure when it 
can stand in for the underdevelopment of 
the market. 
5.3 Family Control and 
Performance
Family firms tend to achieve control rights 
beyond their ownership rights. Through 
the use of control-enhancing mechanisms, 
they manage to achieve this wedge, 
which gives them additional decision-
making power over a broad range of 
corporate matters. This may allow them 
to make additional contributions in terms 
of motivation, expertise and social capital. 
But this may also give them the possibility 
to extract resources from the firm. When 
the latter effect is more significant than 
the former, the situation is detrimental to 
minority shareholders. A range of empirical 
studies using data from numerous countries 
suggests that the wedge between voting 
rights and cash-flow rights adversely affects 
performance. 
A study of a sample of US firms finds 
that, in general, the use of control-
enhancing mechanisms is negatively 
related to performance.85 The resulting 
wedge between control and ownership 
decreases value proportionally: the higher 
the difference between voting rights and 
cash-flow rights, the higher the reduction 
in value. A further investigation of this 
issue, by analyzing a sample of US public 
companies between 1994 and 2000, 
finds that the impact of control-enhancing 
mechanisms on performance depends 
on the specific mechanism used.86 There 
is evidence that dual-class stock and 
disproportionate board representation are 
negatively related to value. Conversely, 
there is no evidence of such negative 
relation when families use pyramidal 
structures or voting agreements, which 
may rather have a positive effect on 
value. The finding about dual-class stock 
is confirmed by another study, which 
analyses a comprehensive list of US dual-
class firms between 1995 and 2002.87 This 
evidence suggests that family firms should 
carefully consider which mechanisms to 
use to control their firms, as their effects on 
performance are different. 
The evidence of a negative effect on 
performance of a separation between 
ownership and control is confirmed by data 
from around the world. Using a sample of 
675 public companies from 11 European 
countries, a study finds that the existence 
of a wedge between control and ownership 
adversely affects family firm performance.88 
A study examining the same question from 
data on 1,301 public companies from eight 
East Asian countries confirms that, in this 
region of the world too, a positive wedge 
between control and ownership decreases 
the value of the firm.89 Interestingly, it 
highlights that this negative effect is strongly 
significant only for family firms, but less 
relevant for state-controlled and widely-
held firms. Family firms are perceived to be 
particularly prone to take advantage of their 
control position to extract resources from 
their firms.
The literature has also addressed the 
separation between ownership and control 
in the context of insider ownership – the 
situation where managers or board 
members have an ownership stake in 
the company. This context is applicable 
to family firms, since typically families 
are actively involved in the business. An 
investigation of the effect on performance 
of the difference between control and 
ownership of the management group, 
using a sample of 1,433 firms from 18 
emerging markets, finds that whenever 
the management group has control rights 
exceeding ownership rights, firm value 
decreases.90 Moreover, a look at the same 
question using data on 800 firms from eight 
East Asian countries during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis finds that during the crisis, 
stock returns declined significantly more 
for firms with strong separation between 
management control rights and ownership 
rights than for other firms.91 This evidence 
is consistent with the negative effect of the 
wedge between ownership and control on 
performance. 
Family firms are typically characterized by 
a concentration of control in the hands of 
a unique shareholder group, the family. 
The literature has highlighted that the 
distribution of control rights has an effect 
on firm performance. Among Finnish public 
companies, between 1993 and 2000, 
there is evidence that family firms with a 
more equal distribution of voting power 
among blockholders performed better.92 
Therefore, the presence of at least another 
blockholder with substantial control, 
besides the family, increases the value of 
the family firm. This result is conceptually 
consistent with a theoretical argument that, 
in closely-held corporations, the optimal 
ownership structure has either one large 
shareholder or multiple shareholders of 
similar size.93 
An important instrument through which 
the family maintains control of the firm is 
the board of directors. The composition 
of the board of directors has a relevant 
effect on the performance of the family 
firm. Among the 500 Standard & Poor’s 
firms during the period 1992-1999, family 
involvement on the board was non-
linearly related to performance: family 
involvement at moderate levels was helpful; 
at excessive levels, it was detrimental.94 
This suggests that, at moderate levels, 
the presence of the family on the board 
may provide benefits to the firm. However, 
if the family has too much power in the 
board, it is likely to extract resources 
from the firm, hindering performance. The 
family role in the board can be regulated 
by the presence of outside directors. 
Typically, outside directors are of two 
types: independent (directors having no 
other connection with the firm) and affiliate 
(directors having some business tie with 
the firm). The key finding of this study is the 
expected positive relation between board 
independence and performance: the more 
independent the board is, the better the 
firm performs. Conversely, the presence of 
affiliated directors is negatively related to 
performance. This evidence suggests that 
only independent directors are able to play 
a moderating role in the board.
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5.4 Family Management and 
Performance
Family management occurs when either the 
founder or a descendant manages the firm. 
This latter case is very common. There is 
wide evidence suggesting that family firms 
often prefer to have the heir managing the 
family business, instead of an outsider, 
as discussed in Section 3. However, it is 
important to ask how this impacts family 
firm performance. 
The literature has offered contradictory 
evidence of the effect of family 
management on performance. Some 
studies have identified a positive effect. 
In the US, family-managed firms have 
been found to be more valuable and more 
efficient,95 while Norwegian firms that are 
family-managed are seen to be significantly 
less productive than non-family firms.96
More recent literature has investigated 
the issue at a deeper level, clarifying 
that the result depends on the type of 
family management. Among US firms, 
having the founder as CEO is positively 
related to performance, while having the 
descendant as CEO is negatively related 
to performance.97 In other words, family 
firms perform well when they are led by 
the founder but not when they are led 
by a descendant. Further, the presence 
of an outside CEO is beneficial for the 
family firm, as long as the founder acts 
as a chairperson, confirming the crucial 
importance of the contribution of the 
founder’s skills and expertise to the family 
firm. This result is consistent with the 
findings from a study of 896 US public 
companies that the outperformance of 
family firms is entirely attributable to lone 
founder firms.98 Therefore, there seems 
to be evidence of a positive founder-CEO 
effect and a negative descendant-CEO 
effect.
A vast body of literature has investigated 
the positive founder-CEO effect on family 
firm performance. A significant founder-
CEO effect on firm performance is visible 
among US public companies.99 A positive 
relation between having the founder as 
CEO and long-run investment performance 
is also found among US companies, but 
mostly in high-technology industries.100 
A sample of 2,327 US public companies 
between 1992 and 2002 confirms the 
positive performance of these firms, by 
showing that a hypothetical investment 
strategy to buy founder-CEO firms would 
have significantly outperformed the market 
by more than 10% annually.101 Moreover, 
a strong difference in behaviour is in 
evidence between founder-CEO firms 
and descendant-CEO firms. In particular, 
founder-CEO firms invest more in R&D, 
have higher capital expenditures and make 
more focused merger and acquisition (M&A) 
decisions. 
The key finding seems to be the negative 
effect of the descendant CEO on family 
firm performance. This problem is related 
to family succession decisions and has 
been widely studied. A sample of 335 
CEO transitions in firms with concentrated 
ownership shows that any transition 
involving a family relation – where there 
is a family tie between the new CEO and 
the previous CEO, the founder or the 
blockholder – has a negative impact on 
performance.102 Firms appointing CEOs 
based on family ties perform 14% worse 
in accounting terms and 16% worse 
in market terms during the three years 
following the transition. The findings 
suggest that family firms may be making 
succession decisions based on reasons 
other than merit. In testing this hypothesis 
by investigating the effect of education on 
family CEO performance, the study finds 
that firms where the family CEO did not 
attend a selective undergraduate institution 
significantly underperform firms appointing 
a non-family CEO, while this effect is not 
observed in firms where the family CEO 
attended a selective college. 
An investigation of family CEO performance 
impact using a sample of 5,334 CEO 
successions in Danish firms between 1994 
and 2002 confirms that appointing a family 
CEO implies a significant 4% decrease 
in accounting-based performance.103 
Moreover, this underperformance is 
particularly evident in large firms, fast-
growing industries and skilled-labour 
industries. An analysis of the quality of 
management practices on a sample of 732 
medium-sized manufacturing firms from 
the US, the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany, involving an innovative survey 
technique, finds that family firms choosing 
the CEO based on primogeniture are very 
poorly managed.104 Having a first-born 
descendant as CEO has a significantly 
negative effect on management quality, 
which is shown to be positively related to 
various measures of performance such as 
firm productivity and firm value.
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6. Key Insights
The family enterprise is a complex and 
distinctive organization, in that it pursues 
multiple objectives: maintaining unity 
and harmony within the family; achieving 
prosperity of the family firm; keeping 
control of the business across generations; 
mitigating family conflict; preserving its liquid 
assets and so on. The survival and success 
of the family enterprise, which encompasses 
the family, the family-controlled operating 
company or companies, one or more 
foundations, and often a family office, 
requires a coherent and interdependent 
governance system to enable the realization 
of the family’s multiple objectives. 
Family governance refers to the rules, 
processes and institutions which enable 
the decision-making and implementation 
of policies concerning the oversight and 
management of family affairs. It includes 
informal elements, such as values and 
norms shared among the family members, 
as well as formal elements, such as the 
family constitution, family council and 
family committees. Informal elements play 
a primary role: without a common ground 
of shared values, beliefs and norms, no 
formal structure can successfully operate. 
The family is the cornerstone on which 
the related entities are based. Therefore, 
its successful governance is crucial to the 
survival of the entire family enterprise.
The literature points to fairness perception 
as the core informal element in family 
governance. Fairness perception leads to 
higher satisfaction with family decisions 
and stronger identification with the family, 
while alleviating family conflict. Enabling 
a climate of fairness, a collaborative 
approach to resolving conflict and frequent 
communication has been shown to enhance 
family harmony and the effectiveness of 
management in the family business.105 
The academic and professional literature on 
the governance of the family enterprise has 
produced a number of important findings. It 
offers an important resource for families, as 
well as for practitioners working closely with 
family enterprises. 
 
These “soft” aspects of family governance 
are particularly important in the multi-
branch, multi-generational family. Hence, 
close attention must be paid to these 
aspects during the process of developing 
family governance policies and institutions. 
The family firm is the primary source 
of wealth for the family. Governance 
of the family firm must be designed to 
carefully address the potential conflict of 
interest between family and non-family 
shareholders through the ownership 
structure, the composition of the board 
of directors, the compensation schemes 
and the management of the family firm. By 
proactively addressing these issues in the 
design of family business governance, family 
firm owners can alleviate the adverse effect 
on value that may arise. 
Families frequently use control-enhancing 
mechanisms, that is, instruments that allow 
them to have voting rights in excess of 
cash-flow rights. These instruments include 
dual-class stock, pyramidal structures, 
cross-holdings and voting agreements. 
The resulting wedge between voting rights 
and ownership rights gives the family the 
possibility of exercising majority control 
on the firm. The existence of a large 
wedge could be perceived by non-family 
shareholders as an attempt by the family to 
extract private benefits and thereby depress 
firm value. Elements of the governance 
structure of the family firm, such as the 
composition of the board of directors and 
the design of executive compensation and 
dividend policy, are useful in mitigating the 
potential adverse effects on value that arise 
from the wedge.
The succession decision is a major 
challenge for the family: how to transfer 
ownership, control and management to 
the next generation. The literature has 
shown that failure to carefully manage all 
aspects of this transition may lead to lower 
firm performance, ultimately threatening 
the survival of the family enterprise. There 
is substantial evidence that families tend 
to keep control of their business across 
generations. The main rationale behind 
this behaviour is simply that families have 
multiple concurrent objectives: they seek 
family harmony and unity while pursuing 
financial wealth. The research has given 
additional, complementary explanations for 
this phenomenon – that succession occurs 
internally when the legal environment is 
weak,106 or that the business is kept within 
the family due to the high specificity of the 
family firm’s assets.107 The main takeaway is 
that families should approach the transition 
decision carefully and wisely. If the choice 
is to transfer the family business to the heir, 
The family is the 
cornerstone on which the 
related entities are based. 
Therefore, its successful 
governance is crucial to 
the survival of the entire 
family enterprise.
the key message is that such transition 
requires wide preparation and detailed 
planning.108 
Wealthy families often choose to create 
a family office dedicated to serving the 
financial and personal needs of family 
members. While family offices vary in 
size and scope, their mandate includes 
managing the liquid wealth of family 
members (i.e. those financial assets that are 
not tied to the family-controlled operating 
company); serving as the administrative 
backbone of the family enterprise to 
facilitate family life; and providing a range 
of family services including estate planning, 
which encompasses, among other 
matters, tax-efficient wealth transfer to 
future generations. The governance and 
management of the family office needs to 
be structured with a mix of family members 
and professionals so as to enable smooth 
functioning of the family office while ensuring 
sufficient controls to mitigate the exposure 
faced by the family. 
Family enterprises typically carry out their 
philanthropic activities through foundations. 
The family foundation’s main activity 
consists of providing grants to recipients 
in a tax-efficient manner. The benefits of 
the family foundation can extend beyond 
tax savings and reputation. In fact, the 
establishment of such an entity has major 
positive effects on the family dynamics: 
it provides financial education to family 
members, strengthens communication 
and facilitates discussion.109 The family 
foundation requires its own effective 
governance structure. In particular, an 
important aspect concerns whether to 
designate a family member or an outsider 
as administrator. The literature suggests 
that the choice of an outside professional 
administrator has multiple advantages 
including professional management, better 
relationship between the foundation and 
the community, and infusion of a fresh 
perspective into the family.110 
The key question is how the governance 
elements of the family enterprise affect 
the wealth, unity and happiness of the 
family. The clear message that emerges 
from the literature is that a codified family 
enterprise governance system – one which 
has been developed through a process 
of elaborate consultations and dialogue 
among family members, and which reflects 
the family structure and dynamics as well 
as the various incentives-related issues that 
characterize a family firm – contributes to 
enhancing family harmony and happiness 
as well as family wealth. 
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